Domestically funded (and performed) research and development (R&D) has historically been a major source of productivity gains in U.S. agriculture, and a principal source of R&D spillovers to the rest of the world. In the waning decades of the 20 th century, U.S. policymakers opted to ratchet down the rate of growth in public support for food and agricultural R&D. As the 21 st century unfolds, slowing growth gave way to real cutbacks, reversing the accumulation of U.S.-sourced public R&D capital over most of the previous century and more. The 2014 Farm Bill did little to reverse these long-run research funding trajectories-politicians apparently ignored economic evidence about the still substantial social payoffs to that research and the consequent slowdown in U.S. agricultural productivity growth associated with the spending slowdown. While slower population growth translates to slower growth in consumption, global average yield growth is also slowing for many crops, especially relative to the rapid rates seen during the Green Revolution years of the 1960s and 1970s. Slower yield growth, ceteris paribus, translates to slower output growth. To the extent Ruttan (1982, p. 60) was right-in that higher levels of crop yields (or productivity levels more generally) require research to run even harder to stand still and prevent yields from falling-the amount, nature and success of R&D worldwide in sustaining farm productivity is a critical determinant of the future balance to be struck between agricultural production and consumption. These investments in maintenance research, that forestall productivity declines attributable to co-evolutionary pest and disease pressures and changes in climate or other factors that would otherwise cause yields to fall, are in addition to the 1 The U.N.'s high end estimate has global population in 2100 totaling 16.6 billion (versus 10.9 billion for the midline estimate and 6.8 billion for the low end figure. ) All of these estimates involve out-of-sample assumptions about the fertility and mortality rates that underpin these estimates. Holding these underlying parameters at their present rates would put the estimated world population in 2010 at 28.7 billion (United Nations 2013, table I.1).
Long-run and Global R&D Funding Trajectories:
The U.
S. Farm Bill in a Changing Context
Concerns about our ability to balance the world food equation without plowing in the plant have resurfaced in recent years. Although a recent reassessment of global production and consumption prospects ) is less concerning than others have reported (for example Brown 2013; The Club of Rome 2012), they observe that the future is unlikely to be like the past in several important respects. While the projected growth in average per capita incomes, the changing demographics (generally aging) of the world population, and the increasing demand for agricultural feedstocks for biofuel uses are important determinants of prospective growth in agricultural consumption in the decades ahead, they are secondary sources of consumption growth. Around 70 percent of Pardey et al.'s (2014) prospective food consumption growth to 2050 is attributable to growth in population. However, future population growth is deemed to markedly deviate from the past: the United Nations (2013) While slower population growth translates to slower growth in consumption, global average yield growth is also slowing for many crops, especially relative to the rapid rates seen during the Green Revolution years of the 1960s and 1970s. Slower yield growth, ceteris paribus, translates to slower output growth. To the extent Ruttan (1982, p. 60 ) was right-in that higher levels of crop yields (or productivity levels more generally) require research to run even harder to stand still and prevent yields from falling-the amount, nature and success of R&D worldwide in sustaining farm productivity is a critical determinant of the future balance to be struck between agricultural production and consumption. These investments in maintenance research, that forestall productivity declines attributable to co-evolutionary pest and disease pressures and changes in climate or other factors that would otherwise cause yields to fall, are in addition to the 1 The U.N.'s high end estimate has global population in 2100 totaling 16.6 billion (versus 10.9 billion for the midline estimate and 6.8 billion for the low end figure.) All of these estimates involve out-of-sample assumptions about the fertility and mortality rates that underpin these estimates. Holding these underlying parameters at their present rates would put the estimated world population in 2010 at 28.7 billion (United Nations 2013, table I.1).
investments in R&D required to promote and sustain the additional growth in productivity required to feed a global population of 10.9 billion or so by 2100.
Developing an informed sense of these productivity prospects requires an understanding of the global patterns of investment in R&D that are pivotal to promoting growth in agricultural productivity. Decisions about the amount and priorities of U.S. spending on agricultural R&D should be cognizant of the changing global realities of these innovation markets, which are becoming increasingly interconnected via international trade in innovation and the food and agricultural output these innovations make possible. With that firmly in mind, our objective in this paper is to report and evaluate entirely new evidence on the global investments in R&D that affect the productivity performance of the food and agriculture sectors in the United States and worldwide. In so doing we present an assessment of trends in public food and agricultural R&D spending worldwide for the past half a century (specifically, 1960-2009 ) using a revised and updated version of the InSTePP R&D Series.
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Evidence of investments on private-sector R&D focused on this part of the world's economy is much more limited. Here we unveil and evaluate summary statistics from the first release version of private spending on food and agricultural R&D worldwide to be included in the InSTePP R&D Series. Research focused on food and agriculture is not the only source of innovation in this sector. The results of public and private research in the broader biological and informatics sciences, engineering, ecology, health and numerous other areas of inquiry also show up as innovations in food and agriculture (and vice versa). To gain a more complete insight into the relevant R&D spending affecting U.S. and global food and agriculture we juxtapose the sector-specific R&D spending estimates against entirely new estimates of global total (all public and private) R&D spending developed by Dehmer and Pardey (2014) InSTePP is the International Science and Technology Practice and Policy center at the University of Minnesota. A prior version of this global public sector series was summarized in Pardey, Alston and Chan-Kang (2013a and b) and Pardey and Beddow (2013) . This version supersedes and updates the prior estimates, although the overall patterns observed in the prior releases are preserved. Details of all data sources and estimation methods are in Pardey et al. (2015) . public (or even more narrowly construed federal government) funding for food and agricultural research conducted in the United States. We reveal that the U.S. position in this global R&D landscape has changed in substantive ways, especially over the past decade, partly as a result of investment decisions taken by governments and private entities elsewhere in the world, but also as a consequence of changed investment priorities in the Unites States.
The Global Geography of R&D in 2009
In 2009 total. In contrast, the middle-income countries accounted for about one-fifth of the total and the 28 low-income country share was just 0.3 percent. Although there are huge spatial disparities in the funding and conduct of R&D worldwide, Dehmer and Pardey (2014) show that the geography of overall R&D funding-and, inevitably, the location of innovation that funding brings about-is trending towards the larger (and generally faster growing) middle-income countries.
[ Figure 1 : Public and private R&D worldwide: Total, and food and agriculturally-related, 2009] The geography of R&D focused on food and agriculture is different (Figure 1, Panel b) . In brief, the U.S. share of total public and private R&D is much smaller (17.6 percent, versus 33.4 percent for all R&D) and the global share of food and agricultural R&D conducted in other rich countries is also smaller (37.9 percent, versus 44.9 percent for all R&D). Public and private agencies in the middle-income countries now spend $25.7 billion (42.1 percent) on food and agricultural R&D, compared with a corresponding 55.5 percent market share for the high-income countries.
Moreover, just three countries (Brazil, India and China) account for 68.5 percent of the (public and private) food and agricultural R&D by all the middle-and low-income countries combined.
Like the geography of food and agricultural production itself, food and agricultural R&D is highly spatially concentrated. In 2009, just 10 countries accounted for 65.6 percent of the value of agricultural production (FAO 2014), while 73.9 percent of the food and agricultural R&D was conducted by the top 10 R&D performing countries (with 59.0 percent of that food and agricultural R&D undertaken in the top five performing countries).
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The Shifting Global Landscape of Food and Agricultural R&D Spending
The more notable trends in global food and agricultural R&D spending are a) a substantial rise in the share of that spending being conducted by middle-income countries, and a decline in the richcountry share, b) an increase in the global share being conducted by the private sector, especially among the high-, and, of late, middle-income countries, and c) an exceptionally small and slightly declining share of global spending taking place in the low-income countries, with very little of that spending conducted by the private sector.
Global Public Research-The Rise of the Middle-Income Countries
After adjusting for inflation, public spending on food and agricultural R&D rose worldwide from These income-group trends belie substantial variation in the evolving pattern of investment in public food and agricultural R&D at the country level. For instance, while real spending by the rich-country group grew on average after 2000, albeit much more slowly than in previous decades, inflation-adjusted spending actually shrank for 16 (48.5 percent) of the countries in this 3 The world's largest agricultural producers by value in 2009 (in descending order) were China, United States, India, Brazil, Indonesia, France, Pakistan, Germany, Argentina, and Turkey. The largest agricultural R&D performers (public plus private R&D (again in descending order) were China, United States, Japan, India, Brazil, Germany, France, Korea, United Kingdom, and Spain. Eastern European and Former Soviet Union countries are excluded. We include only 124 countries for which agricultural R&D data are available. 
Public versus Private Research Worldwide
For much of modern history, the preponderance of formal global food and agricultural R&D was conducted by public agencies, including government research labs and academic institutions (with a comparatively minor share undertaken by non-governmental organizations). [ Figure 2 : Global R&D trends for food and agriculture, 1960-2009] 4 Prior to the advent of publicly funded research, beginning in the early 19 th century Germany with the development of research universities and the subsequent establishment of "agricultural experiment stations" in Scotland and England towards the middle of that century (Russell 1966; Ruttan 1982) , informal private innovation (in the form of tinkering and trial and error efforts by farmers and other individual inventors) predominated.
Most of the world's private food and agricultural R&D spending was historically concentrated in and targeted towards the rich-countries, but that too is now beginning to change. In total, the share of global private sector spending on food and agricultural R&D in high-income countries was 65 percent in 2009, down from 85 percent in 1980. The United States alone accounted for 33 percent of this private R&D spending in 1980. That shared peaked in 1997 at 37 percent and has slid since, down to 23 percent by 2009. Notably, that same year, Brazil, India and China combined conducted more private food and agricultural R&D than the United States: $7.7 billion versus $6.2 billion for the United States. This is a dramatic and historical shift in the global food and agricultural R&D landscape. Three decades ago, in 1980, total private spending by these three countries was but a fraction (26 percent) of the corresponding U.S. figure ($2.9 billion).
[ Figure 3 : Global per-capita income trends in private food and agricultural R&D, 1980-2009] Private sector spending on food and agricultural R&D in low-income countries is minuscule; accounting for just 0.06 percent of global private sector spending in 2009 and just 1.7 percent of the total (public and private) sector spending in this part of the world. As Pardey and Beddow (2013) discussed, the more limited private-sector participation in agricultural research done in or for developing countries stems from several factors. A significant share of food produced in developing countries is consumed by the household that produced it. Even when commodities enter the marketing chain, they are often purchased in less processed forms for preparation and eating at home. Consequently, a much smaller share of the food bill in developing countries accrues to postfarm food processing, shipping, and merchandising activities, areas where the incentives for private innovation are relatively pronounced. Likewise, on the supply side, purchased inputs (such as herbicides, insecticides, improved crop varieties or animal breeds, and all sorts of agricultural machinery) constitute a comparatively small share of the total costs of production in many agricultural market segments in many parts of the developing world. While this is likely to change as incomes rise and infrastructure improves, the pace of change will be gradual in the poorest areas, where (semi-)subsistence farming still predominates. The cost of doing business in places with small and often remote farms subject to poor market access, lack of farm credit, and limited communication services also undercuts private participation in agribusiness, in turn reducing the private incentives to invest in R&D targeted to these markets.
In addition, a plethora of regulations, many times inefficiently enforced, combined with an uncertain and incomplete legal environment (especially related to contract law and intellectual property protection) make it difficult for local and multinational private interests to profitably penetrate agricultural markets with new seed, chemical, or other agricultural technologies in substantial parts of the developing world.
The standout public and private sector trend in these data is China. R&D done by China, and thus the BIC aggregate, shrank substantially throughout the 1960s; a response to the turmoil of the Great Leap Forward and the subsequent Cultural Revolution. As Fan and Pardey (1992) Not all these and subsequent reforms to the country's R&D system had desirable outcomes, as Cao et al. (2013) describe.
(2012), Pepsico (2012), General Mills (2014), and Cargill, although the extent of their spending focused on food and agricultural R&D in China is difficult to discern. 6 Multinational agribusiness firms are also judiciously increasing their R&D presence in other foreign markets, for example Cargill also has R&D operations in Brazil and Syngenta, PioneerDupont in India and Nestle in Chile, China, Nigeria, and India. As food and agribusiness markets continue to grow and formalize-typically characterized by intensification of agricultural production methods and a growth in post-farm value adding activities-the offshoring of R&D by U.S. and European based firms adds to the overall growth in R&D from domestic firms operating in these emerging markets. Thus the empirical and anecdotal evidence reinforce the notion that we are in the midst of a modern historical transition whereby the geographical locus of innovation in food and agricultural markets is shifting well beyond the borders of the rich countries that have historically dominated research in this sector.
US R&D Spending Patterns
The U.S. has lost substantial global market share regarding public and, of late, also private spending on R&D related to food and agriculture. Part of these structural shifts stem from policy and market developments in the rest-of-the-world. Part of these shifts are the outcome of public and private decisions and developments within the United States, to which we now turn.
R&D Within the U.S. Public Sector
The conduct, orientation and funding of U.S. public food and agricultural R&D has changed dramatically over the past half production and the public spending on research that supports the sector is spatially concentrated.
In 2009, just 10 states accounted for almost 53 percent of total agricultural production by value and accounted for 46 percent of the spending on research performed by the SAESs.
[ Figure 4 : U.S. public agricultural R&D by performing agency, U.S. funding priorities for R&D have also changed substantially over the years. Significant investments in maintenance research are required just to maintain farm productivity and prevent it from falling. However, as other agendas such as research on health, nutrition, the environment, and biofuels gained ground, the share of SAES research directed to enhancing the productivity of U.S. farmers-or simply sustaining past farm productivity gains via maintenance research-declined from an estimated 65 percent of the total in 1976 to only 56 percent in 2009 (Pardey et al. 2015) .
The structure of support for publicly performed food and agricultural R&D has also undergone major changes. While research conducted in USDA labs has been, and still is, almost entirely 
U.S. Private versus Public R&D Developments
Growth in the private participation in U.S. food and agricultural R&D has been unfolding for at least the past half century. During the early 1950s the public-private spending split averaged 57 to 43 percent ( Figure 6 , Panel a), but by 1974 the private sector outspent public R&D agencies.
Since then the private share has grown to 61 percent by 2009; still short of the private share of overall R&D in the United States (66 percent in 2009).
[ Figure 6 : U.S. public and private food and agricultural R&D spending, 1950-2009] Changes in the appropriability of the returns to investment in food and agricultural R&D no doubt spurred some of these developments. The use rights and associated rents from developing and deploying innovations changed as a consequence of changes in public policy and associated A naïve notion is that the stalled or shrinking support for public agricultural R&D is of little farm productivity consequence given the rise in private sector R&D oriented to food and agriculture. Important as the Farm Bill funding is to U.S. food and agricultural R&D, the amount and effectiveness of funding for food and agricultural R&D is also affected by a host of other factors.
Some relate to the ways by which these funds are disbursed, including the balance between competitive and non-competitive modes of allocation, and the associated procedural and institutional details.
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Other legislative, legal and especially intellectual property rights policies and practices affect innovation incentives generally, and food and agricultural R&D in particular.
As the new data presented here make clear, the performance, prospects and (economic) consequences of (public) food and agricultural R&D in the United States are increasingly shaped by developments elsewhere in the world. While the United States is arguably still the 7 See Hurley, Rao and Pardey (2014) for a recent summary and assessment of the returns to food and agricultural R&D evidence.
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This includes a limited, one-off, startup allocation of funds in the amount of $200 million made available by way of the newly formed Foundation for Food and Agricultural R&D, FFRA, equivalent to only $40 million a year over the anticipated five-year life of the bill. The FFRA is a non-profit entity with a mandate to solicit non-federal (including private) funding, which is then matched with federal government funding to underwrite research focused on addressing key problems of national and international significance. The FFRA has real potential for reshaping public-private partnerships in U.S. food and agricultural R&D, but unfortunately the limited funding authorized by Congress is likely to severely curtail this potential. For example, Pardey, Beddow and Buccola. (2014) predominant source of innovation in global agriculture, the tide appears to be turning. Over the past several decades, and especially the most recent decade, other (particularly the rapidly growing middle-income) countries have gained significant ground, especially in terms of their shares of total food and agricultural R&D spending. This is not only a consequence of their more rapid rates of growth in public R&D spending, which have been evident for some time, but also a more recent, and potentially equally profound, uptick in the rate of investment in private food and agricultural R&D. If this continues, which seems likely, it is bound to change the global landscape of innovation in food and agriculture. With other key agricultural producers giving serious policy attention to and sustained public support for their domestic research systems, waiting five years for the 2019 Farm Bill to revitalize support for U.S. publiclyperformed food and agricultural R&D is a risky course of action for the prospects of both domestic and global agriculture. 
